The party form did not “die”: it is mutating. M5S—the acronym for the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle—and LLA (Javier Milei’s political force in Argentina) are very different cases—separated by a decade or more—but they share the same starting point: the disenchantment of a significant portion of the electorate with the dominant parties. The focus of this text is not technology as a mere embellishment (“they use social media”), nor the outsider aesthetic, but rather learning from these cases about their organizational mechanism: how that disenchantment is transformed into power and who controls the actual infrastructure that enables its coordination.

Comedian Beppe Grillo, a founding public figure of Italy’s M5S

For this, I draw primarily on the work of Italian researcher Paolo Gerbaudo and the parameters he outlines when discussing “digital parties” or “platform parties” in his book The Digital Party (2018), which, inexplicably, has never been translated into Spanish (the book focuses on an analysis of the M5S, Podemos, La France Insoumise, the German Pirate Party, and the pro-Jeremy Corbyn Momentum platform, with mentions of Bernie Sanders and his political tendency).

Paolo Gerbaudo’s study on “platform parties,” published in the United Kingdom in 2018

The Essentials in 20 Seconds

How do you build a political force when the traditional party no longer works?

M5S: incubated by the private sector + internal platform (Rousseau) + an outsider as the figurehead (Grillo).
LLA: convergence of three sectors + hyperleader candidate (Milei) + political “ownership” (Karina) + dependence on third-party infrastructure.

The comparison is organized around a structural difference: technological backend (proprietary platform) versus relational backend (control through networks of trust).

Two concepts to avoid confusion

Backend: the place where political energy is captured and coordinated (registration, rules, decision-making, internal discipline, control of intermediaries).
Startup party: a lean, flexible organization that grows rapidly and is highly scalable (with a risk of subsequent latency).

What am I writing about here? (table of contents)

Context and origins of the M5S and LLA.
Structural differences (origins, electoral success, leadership, funding, internal organization).
Da Empoli as an intuition (the startup party with a CEO).
Gerbaudo as an analytical lens (digital/platform parties and their tensions).
The Limits of the “Startup” Concept if you don’t distinguish it from a platform.
The historical metaphor: from the factory party to the platform party (and their limits).

In summary: I compare two emerging forms of political organization—one with its own platform and the other relying on third-party infrastructure—to understand what part of contemporary power is at stake in the control of the backend.

Context and Origins — Case 1: M5S

M5S: a party incubated by the private sector (with Grillo as its “warmth and passion”)

Context: the 2008 crisis + the first digital wave + prior anti-politics sentiment.
Origin: Casaleggio Associati identifies the possibility of creating a party of its “own.”
Method: blog → community → MeetUp → structure.
Formalization of the backend: Rousseau.
Tension: platform as a promise of participation / platform as a center of control.

The M5S grew amid the 2008 economic crisis, the immigration issue, and the backlash against the fiscal austerity measures promoted by the European Union in that country and others such as Greece and Spain (where the populists gaining electoral capital were on the left). In media terms, it leveraged the first wave of social media and digital channels (blogs, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube).

As for the origins of the M5S, it is a completely novel experiment: it is a party that arose when a private-sector actor (the owners of the firm Casaleggio Associati), professionally engaged in persuasion, identified the opportunity to create a party under its control. In this sense, it breaks with all the playbooks and the previous tradition, in which research and communication specialists provide their services to political clients.

Although Gianroberto Casaleggio was not a political consultant—he worked in digital marketing for commercial purposes—he recognized the opportunity to leverage his know-how to create a political organization that is 100% native to the virtual environment. He did so through a private association called Rousseau, using an outsider—the comedian Beppe Grillo—as a figurehead.

Gianroberto Casaleggio, the marketing entrepreneur who conceived the Italian M5S

He began developing this in 2005, and the M5S ran in a national election for the first time in 2009. In 2021, due to a political and legal conflict, the M5S severed ties with the Rousseau platform and businessman Casaleggio. In 2024, Grillo lost his role as guarantor following an internal reform, consolidating Giuseppe Conte’s leadership.

But Casaleggio did not propel Grillo in a vacuum: he did so once polling series were already revealing an anti-party niche. In 2007, trust in political parties fell to 8%, and a public opinion report described it as the “year of anti-politics” (Demos & Pi, 2007); in 2008, only 10% trusted political parties, and 64.2% said that “today there are no major differences between the parties” (Demos & Pi, 2008). In 2006, 29.1% considered it “legitimate to abstain” (Demos & Pi, 2006).

At the same time, Beppe Grillo had a 57% approval rating in 2007 and a 47% approval rating in 2008 (Demos & Pi, 2007; Demos & Pi, 2008).

The digital mobilization that would lead to the M5S began on 07/16/2005 with “Incontriamoci: MeetUp,” a call issued through Grillo’s blog to organize local nodes (Grillo, 2005). These indicators and the prior digital organizing define the terrain the M5S would occupy from 2009 onward.

Context and Origins — Case 2: La Libertad Avanza

LLA: Convergence of Three Sectors and the Milei Siblings’ Political “Ownership”

Context: post-pandemic + inflation + cultural backlash + new global right-wing movements.
Three sectors: Milei (TV/viral) + Karina (organization/ownership) + political consulting (Move Group) + amplifiers.
Media logic: TV as trigger, social media as expansion.
Organizational logic: no internal digital democracy; centralized control.
Backend: relational (trust, exclusivity, intermediaries).

In the case of La Libertad Avanza, the context of its development is the post-pandemic era, runaway inflation of the Argentine peso, and the backlash against the “green wave” (feminism and the achievement of legal abortion), against the backdrop of the rise of new right-wing movements globally (of which Trump is the most prominent example).

Argentine President Javier Milei during his time as a regular TV panelist

Three clearly defined groups came together; this convergence is what allowed the party form to take shape in LLA. It differs from the M5S because it is not a company that identifies the potential of an “anti-politics” space (as in the Italian case), but rather the convergence of these three sectors that allows that space to be exploited, with the political partnership between the Milei siblings as the de facto “owner.”

On the one hand, Javier Milei began promoting himself on Argentina’s broadcast TV as a “libertarian economist” who directed his barbs against “the political caste” in general, emphasizing first Macrism and then Kirchnerism: his provocative style earned him high ratings and led to his clips (video snippets) going viral on various digital platforms. During this explosive media blitz, his sister Karina Milei became convinced that she should propel him into politics (De Masi, 2024): his campaign for the National Chamber of Deputies representing the City of Buenos Aires in 2021 was a resounding success (17.04% in the general mid-term elections).

The biography of Santiago Caputo, senior advisor to President Milei

On the other hand, the private consulting firm Move Group—whose founders trained under Jaime Durán Barba and later established an independent firm—had identified that approximately 10% of voters were no longer willing to vote for anyone associated with either Cristina Fernández or Mauricio Macri. They therefore saw room for an “anti-politics” candidate and set out to find one through a kind of scouting. Along the way, they came across Javier Milei and, after a series of iterations, managed to position Santiago Caputo, one of their partners, as the chief strategist of his presidential campaign. Although the Argentine firm Move Group actively sought to exploit that space (Jastreblansky and Jove, 2025), it does not control the party form, but it does wield considerable influence (which has varied over time). Furthermore, unlike Casaleggio Associati, its expertise was not in digital marketing but in political consulting.

The third sector consists of influencers on X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, etc., who advanced an agenda aligned with Milei’s own (libertarian and anti-progressive), such as Ramiro Marra, Agustín Laje, Carlos Maslatón, Eduardo Prestofilippo (El Presto), Manuel Gorostiaga (Emmanuel Danann), etc., who played a key role in consolidating the Milei phenomenon, but most of them were eventually sidelined after contributing their social, relational, and symbolic capital.

Santiago Abascal, leader of Vox (the Spanish New Right), alongside “El Gordo Dan,” a libertarian streamer

This is a key point, because while Milei established himself as a public figure thanks to TV, he only had a significant presence on X and, to a lesser extent, on Instagram. Initially, there was no strategic approach to his social media accounts to systematize his positioning across the second wave of social media platforms and digital channels (Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, X). These alliances allow Milei to become relatively independent from TV and bypass intermediaries: they serve as his gateway to new audiences. Once established, he ceases to engage with those who are critical or dissenting and promotes new intermediaries, such as Mariano Pérez (Breakpoint), Tomás Jurado (El Peluca Milei), and Daniel Parisini (El Gordo Dan).

Da Empoli: the “Netflix of politics” intuition (and the startup party with a CEO)

Da Empoli serves as a popular gateway to the topic.
What it gets right: highlighting the M5S’s organizational innovation.
Its image: a “startup party” as a political product; Casaleggio as CEO.
Difference from Gerbaudo: focus on spin doctors/strategists and varieties of populism.

Originally published as “Gli ingegneri del caos. Teoria e tecnica dell’Internazionale populista“.

The work of Italian-Swiss author Giuliano da Empoli has been discussed much more widely in Latin America, after first finding success in France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and, of course, Switzerland and Italy. In Argentina, his work has gained traction thanks to references by the country’s leading political analyst, historian Carlos Pagni, in his weekly editorials on current President Javier Milei. First, there was extensive discussion of his novel El mago del Kremlin, then of Los ingenieros del caos (essay), and now of La hora de los depredadores (essay).

I believe that Giuliano da Empoli’s greatest contribution in the field of analysis has been to highlight and historically assess the innovation represented by the M5S in Italy. In the chapter “El Netflix de la política,” he illustrates an organizational transformation: the startup party, where Casaleggio is the CEO. In explaining the M5S phenomenon, he summarizes it as follows:

“Casaleggio understood that the Internet would revolutionize politics and enable the emergence of a new kind of movement, guided by the preferences of voters-as-consumers. He therefore intended to launch a product capable of effectively responding to a political demand that existing parties were unable to satisfy. But he was equally aware that the purely digital dimension remained too cold and distant to give life to a true mass movement in Italy. This was why he needed Beppe Grillo—to bring warmth and passion” (Da Empoli, 2019).

Differences (and why we shouldn’t “throw the baby out with the bathwater”)

Key differences: speed of success, the leader’s role, formalization of “ownership,” funding, and allegations.
Methodological caveat: possible failure does not invalidate organizational innovation.
Practical thesis: learn technically from successes and mistakes.

In addition to the way it emerged, LLA differs from M5S in other important ways:

First, its level of electoral success and the short time it took to achieve it.

Second, Beppe Grillo never ran for any office, unlike Milei, who was elected to the Chamber of Deputies and later became president.

Third, although Karina Milei is considered to act as LLA’s “major shareholder,” she did not formally assume that role until she was named party president in late 2024.

Fourth, LLA faces numerous allegations of irregular financing (in the case of the M5S, fundraising was channeled through the private association Rousseau, and Casaleggio was not at the center of the allegations).

I also maintain that LLA in Argentina, despite the unfortunate events it has brought upon itself (Libra, Andis, Espert), has provided a series of lessons that are worth heeding before its possible “failure” leads to the same old outcome: “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” and thinking that politics can be conducted as it was before LLA, rather than learning from the successes and mistakes of that experience (from a technical standpoint).

At the end of the day, a party’s “failure” is a very relative concept, since nothing lasts forever—except change.

Biography of Karina Milei, Secretary General of the Presidency in Argentina and President of La Libertad Avanza

Paolo Gerbaudo’s useful perspective on the new party form

Gerbaudo = the most useful theoretical framework for digital/platform parties.
Highlights key features: participatory promise, internal tools, superbase, distributed centralization, hyperleader.
Introduces a central tension: participatory ideal vs. plebiscitary practice.
Useful for analyzing the M5S; partially useful for analyzing LLA.

To the best of my knowledge, Paolo Gerbaudo’s work represents the most significant analytical and theoretical innovation concerning the new types of political parties that have emerged amid algorithms, platforms, and disintermediation. The ebook was released in 2018 and the print edition in 2019 (by Pluto Press).

In short, Da Empoli joins this debate (2019) with a different focus: the relationship between spin doctors—or digital political communication strategists—and populist movements. Da Empoli, in turn, analyzes many more cases—ideologically further to the right—such as those of Donald Trump and Steve Bannon, Arthur Finkelstein (Viktor Orbán, Benjamin Netanyahu), and Dominic Cummings and UKIP. Both authors also have something to say about Italy’s M5S, but their perspectives on the matter differ completely.

Paolo Gerbaudo, Italian researcher and author of “The Digital Party”

To broaden the perspective on Italy’s M5S, one can also consider the contribution by Bordignon and Ceccarini (2019), in which they show that the five self-imposed “taboos” of this political force were all broken between 2013 and 2018 during its time in the Italian Parliament. Bordignon and Ceccarini refer to “(a) the taboo of representation; (b) the taboo of the media; (c) the taboo of justice; (d) the taboo of leadership; (e) the taboo of alliances,” which can be summarized as the M5S essentially ceasing to hold such rigid positions on these issues, thereby “betraying” its original principles.

As Lorenzo Mosca documents, the M5S’s first target was “the political caste” and its second target was “the journalistic caste.” This bears striking similarities to the steps taken by LLA in Argentina, albeit under different circumstances, since LLA came to power in 2023 and the particular emphasis on attacking journalists began in 2024 with Milei’s famous slogan, “We don’t hate journalists enough” (although this sentiment had already been present since 2021).

In his book “The Digital Party“, Gerbaudo refers to these formations as parties that:

“promise to offer a new form of politics supported by digital technology” that is “more open to ordinary people, more immediate and direct, more authentic and transparent”

“have invested heavily in the development of online decision-making tools” and seek to offer “a new grassroots democracy”

have “promised to ensure greater transparency and prevent political careerism and bureaucracy”

They operate as “platform parties” that collect data and leverage social media devices, services, and applications

“they embed digital transformation at their core, within their internal decision-making structure, rather than using digital communication merely as a tool for external outreach”

They are “outsider” organizations that lack “stable funding and… offices or other similar infrastructure”

are “disintermediating” organizations that eliminate intermediaries and bureaucrats and, as a result, lack “a range of structures and processes typical of traditional parties”

have a highly responsive “superbase” allied with a charismatic leader

are funded by “donations rather than… membership dues”

are “startup” parties that are “flexible and cybernetic,” and “characterized by rapid growth and high scalability”

exhibit “distributed centralization” where “the party base is accompanied by a growing concentration of power in the hands of a charismatic leader” or “hyperleader.”

A dynamic that results in “a clear mismatch between their idealistic rhetoric and their often murky practice: between the face value of participatory democracy, in which all power is granted to members and leaders are mere figureheads, and a plebiscitary reality in which the opposite seems to occur.”

Gerbaudo thereby seeks to update “the party form to match the technological and social conditions of our era.”

“The risk that, in the long term, the lean organizational structure used by the party may prove ineffective, since waves of enthusiasm are followed by periods of latency,” as Gerbaudo notes, is not in itself a reason to discard the startup party, since traditional political forces are also proving ineffective. In any case, startup parties face the challenge of consolidating and regrouping after emerging in the electoral arena as an option.

Gerbaudo argues that platformization offers “outsider” parties a way to compensate for their organizational weaknesses by leveraging the “political work” of a diffuse base. In this model, “likers” and “sharers” function as a “diffuse cyber-army” that extends the party’s reach beyond its core of activists, acting as vectors for what Gerbaudo calls the “transmission of trust” from the leader to personal networks of contacts.

It is precisely this social media ecosystem that LLA leveraged through influencers who amplified its message during the campaign and the first year in office.

8) Startup party: useful, but incomplete if you don’t distinguish between “startup” and “platform”

“Startup party” explains agility and scalability.
But there are many types of startups: a platform ≠ just any startup.
M5S: a formalized platform party (Rousseau, first-party data).
LLA: lean organization (no internal platform, third-party data).
The real difference: where the backend is located.

In this vision, the “startup party” is defined by its agility, its focus on political products (messages and proposals as an MVP—Minimum Viable Product), the intensive use of data and platforms, and CEO-style leadership that accelerates decision-making. I argue that the startup model offers a better starting point for adapting to unstable media environments, although—unlike in the private sector—it would be necessary to assess whether any political startup has transformed into a stable corporation like Netflix.

The M5S operated as a formalized platform party: online voting, digital deliberation, and membership registration via Rousseau. It leveraged native social media formats to scale, generating content from Grillo’s blog that fueled a content-community-mobilization loop. Conversion was channeled through local MeetUps and registration on its own platform (first-party data). Internal control resided in the technological backend: Casaleggio Associati managed the timing, options, and results of the consultations. Gerbaudo identifies the tension between open participation and central control as the “Achilles’ heel”—although this organizational fragility is not unique to digital parties: all parties go through cycles of rise and decline.

The homepage of the Italian M5S’s Rousseau digital platform

Gerbaudo characterizes the digital party as a “startup party,” but he does not distinguish between different types of startups. The model that best describes groups like the M5S is not just any startup, but specifically that of platforms based on user-generated content and data/attention extraction (such as Facebook): free service, users as value generators, monetization of attention, and centralized control of the backend. This distinction matters because the conditions for success and the vulnerabilities of this specific model are not the same as those of other types of startups.

LLA won the presidential election by operating as a lean organization with brand-led leadership, without its own platform or mechanisms for internal democracy. It leveraged viral formats that emerged from television appearances—not digital-native content—amplified by like-minded spokespersons and a mix of organic reach and influencers. Conversion relied on pre-existing communities (libertarians, anti-progressives) and narratives of rupture, without a centralized registry (third-party data via commercial platforms such as YouTube, X, and TikTok). Internal control rests with a network of personal trust (Karina Milei), not with technological infrastructure. Since the party came to power, Karina Milei’s challenge has been to deepen institutionalization and build a territorial base.

9) Is La Libertad Avanza a digital party? (contrast with Gerbaudo)

Similarities: intensive use of social media, superbase, rapid scaling, distributed centralization.
Absences: internal platform, digital democracy, first-party data.
Contradictions: anti-caste rhetoric vs. practices of power; how it is actually funded.
Result: fits “partially,” with a drift toward plebiscitary governance.

In his study of “digital parties,” Paolo Gerbaudo (2019) defines a new type of political organization characterized by the intensive use of digital technologies, the promise of a more direct democracy, and the articulation between a mobilized base and charismatic leadership. Comparing this model with La Libertad Avanza (LLA), led by Javier Milei, reveals only a partial fit. Some defining characteristics are present, while others are absent or manifest themselves in contradictory ways.

For example, LLA makes extensive use of social media to spread its political message, particularly through Milei, who has built a massive following on platforms such as Twitter and TikTok (Annunziata et al., 2024; Retamozo, 2025). However, there are no internal digital decision-making mechanisms or participatory tools for the grassroots. LLA’s organizational structure remains highly centralized and opaque, with no evidence of digital transformation within the party. From a strategic data management perspective, the organization does not rely on first-party data like the M5S.

Patricia Bullrich, Minister of Security, and Daniel Scioli, Secretary of Tourism, as officials in Javier Milei’s administration

Similarly, although Milei promotes a radically anti-bureaucratic discourse and proposes a “new politics” without intermediaries, his government has engaged in practices that have traditionally been criticized, such as nepotism and the concentration of power among his inner circle (Morresi & Ramos, 2023; Semán, 2023). The appointments themselves—Karina Milei as secretary general of the presidency, Patricia Bullrich as head of Security (formerly of the PRO party), and Daniel Scioli as head of Tourism (formerly a Peronist-Kirchnerist)—have been cited as contradicting the “anti-caste” rhetoric.

As for funding, while LLA is not supported by party dues or traditional memberships, it is also not transparently funded by small digital donations, as is the case with other digital parties. In fact, most of its campaign funding came from public funds provided by the state (Balsa, 2024).

It does meet the criteria of a “startup” party: LLA was founded in 2021 and, in just two years, won the presidency, demonstrating a remarkable capacity for scaling up and organizational flexibility (Retamozo, 2025). There is also a youthful, digitized “superbase” that reacts quickly to its leader’s gestures and statements (Aranda et al., 2022). Finally, LLA exhibits what Gerbaudo calls “distributed centralization”: a mobilized and digitized base, but accompanied by a strong concentration of power in the “hyperleader,” who says he shares it with his sister Karina Milei and his strategist Santiago Caputo in the so-called “Iron Triangle.”

In this sense, while LLA shares traits with Gerbaudo’s digital parties, its operation more closely resembles a plebiscitary model with low internal institutionalization than a participatory digital democracy.

10) The Party Form: From Fordism to the Platform (and the Limit of That Metaphor)

Evolution: factory party → television party → platform party.
Gerbaudo draws on Revelli to conceptualize the mass party as a manufacturing enterprise.
Connection to other frameworks (Gurri; Da Empoli and “quantum” politics).
Historical context: marketing, polls, and media modernization.
Final turn: the multi-sided platform as a useful hypothesis… with limits for governing.

Gerbaudo describes the trajectory of organizations from a Fordist model to a platform model. To do so, he relies entirely on Italian political scientist Revelli’s definition of mass parties:

“The party was conceived as a factory where politics was to be produced through collective ‘political labor,’ as if it were a manufacturing plant, inspired by Taylorist criteria of efficiency and rationalization. In this structure, party activists were the equivalent of assembly-line workers, local cadres were production technicians, and the central committee was the corporate management body” (2013).

For Gerbaudo, the party is the “modern Prince,” to use Italian communist Antonio Gramsci’s term.

However, this perspective is supported by decidedly non-Marxist authors such as the Cuban-American former CIA analyst Martin Gurri in “La rebelión del público” and, to some extent, by Da Empoli himself when he speaks of a shift from Newtonian politics to quantum politics. The question of chaos (the raw material of these transformations) must be the subject of a specific and separate analysis.

Gerbaudo does not intend to skip over the various stages that follow the typical mass party—that is, the “professional-electoral party” (Panebianco, 1988), the “catch-all party” (Kirchheimer, 1990), and the “cartel party” (Katz and Mair, 1995), but he sharply simplifies them by condensing these variations into a definition that clearly aligns with the new social and cultural center of gravity: he thus speaks of the “television party,” because television “becomes its primary channel of communication with the electorate and a substitute for committed activism.” For Gerbaudo, “the television party” is best illustrated by the example of Silvio Berlusconi. This element had already been proposed much earlier by Argentine researcher Adriana Amado in her key book “Política pop” (2016), where she highlighted Berlusconi’s case as a pioneering example. The “television party” as a historical moment in Western politics coincides with the consolidation of marketing and advertising and presupposes, as a prerequisite, the establishment of quantitative public opinion polls.

The new political leaders of the 21st century must engage with the innovations emerging from the most dynamic parts of the private sector (regardless of their positions on state intervention or the institutional and/or social transformations they promote), since the private sector is transforming present-day society. If a new model of production and accumulation succeeds, it is because it has ultimately found a new way to rationalize resources and earn profits: that is, a better way to struggle for power. Politics seeks to achieve certain objectives with as little wear and tear as possible.

However, the “user-generated content platform” model only partially captures the complexity of digital parties. A more precise framework is that of the multilateral platform (multi-sided platform): an infrastructure that connects and coordinates multiple distinct groups—“sides”—so that they interact, generating cross-side network effects among them (Hagiu & Wright, 2015; Evans & Schmalensee, 2016).

Amazon is a multi-sided business platform with more than two sides and cross-side network effects

The clearest examples of multi-sided platforms among technology companies have two sides: Uber connects drivers and passengers; Airbnb connects hosts and guests; credit cards connect merchants and consumers. In each case, the platform’s value to one side increases as the other side grows. But political parties function as platforms with more than two sides, which multiplies the complexity. An example of a highly complex multi-sided platform is Amazon: it is not a two-sided relationship; it is a multi-sided platform (buyers, sellers, advertisers, logistics, affiliates). And its power does not lie in “communicating,” but in the backend that coordinates and monetizes cross-side network effects. Of course, a political party (whether more or less successful) is much more complex.

Political parties must simultaneously coordinate voters (who provide legitimacy), candidates (who provide a public face), volunteers and activists (unpaid labor and amplification), donors (money), content creators and influencers (translation of the message and reach), the media (mass visibility), and technical staff (expertise in governing). Each group benefits from the presence of the others: more potential voters attract more competitive candidates; more competitive candidates attract donors; more donors enable better communication; better communication attracts more voters.

The party captures the value of this multi-sided intermediation through control of the backend—whether it’s a technology platform (Rousseau) or a network of trusted intermediaries (the Milei-Caputo circle)—. This framework highlights two specific problems facing startup parties: first, the “chicken-and-egg” challenge—they need critical mass on several sides simultaneously, which explains why they require a hyperleader as an “initial attractor” who temporarily substitutes for that critical mass—; second, their characteristic fragility—if one side collapses, the network effects turn negative and drag the others down in a cascade.

In any case, the multi-sided platform model sheds light on how startup parties capture power, but it faces severe limitations when it comes to understanding how they exercise it. Added to this is another central problem: the ability of those who control the backend to act as effectively as possible in rapidly changing contexts, where what worked once may not be enough the next time. In technology, a startup’s “success” might mean being acquired by Google. In politics, what does “success” mean? Governing? Transforming the system? Simply lasting? Going home with the peace of mind that you won’t go to jail when it’s your turn to lose?

References

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The startup party: from the 5 Star Movement to La Libertad Avanza